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I. INTRODUCTION
At the signing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), President Barack
Obama asserted that, “We all win when investors around the world
have confidence in our markets. We all win when shareholders have
more power and more information. . . . And we all win when folks are
rewarded based on how well they perform, not how well they evade
accountability.”1 After the financial crisis in 2008, the Obama Admin-
istration recognized the need to reconstruct the existing American fi-
nancial regulatory system to ensure that a financial meltdown would
never happen again.2
It is quite clear that Congress’s purpose behind the Dodd-Frank Act
is to redevelop the financial system to ensure that the 2008 financial
crisis will never be repeated.3 However, the Dodd-Frank Act contains
considerable provisions that add substantial new requirements for cer-
tain publicly traded companies based in the United States.4 Analysts
have theorized that the creation of new regulations relating to execu-
tive compensation and corporate governance was due to assertions
that large executive pay contributed to the financial crisis.5 There has
been much debate over whether such changes to executive compensa-
tion and corporate governance practices under Title IX of the Dodd-
Frank Act are meeting the intended goals of financial system reform.6
Traditionally, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or “Commission”) has focused only on the compensation of
executive officers and directors when it implements compensation dis-
closure rules.7 But on September 18, 2013, more than three years after
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-
reform-and-consumer-protection-act [https://perma.cc/K38D-8P72] [hereinafter Re-
marks at the Signing of Dodd-Frank Act].




4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 951–957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1907 (2010).
5. See Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, Regulation of Executive
Compensation in Financial Services 2 (Council on Foreign Relations Squam Lake
Working Grp. on Financial Regulation, Paper No. 8, 2010), i.cfr.org/content/publica-
tions/attachments/Squam_Lake_Working_Paper8.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BYP-8UJV]
(“Many people argue that inappropriate compensation policies in financial companies
contributed to the World Financial Crisis.”).
6. See id. (“We have seen no convincing evidence that high levels of compensa-
tion in financial companies are inherently risky for the companies themselves or the
overall economy.”).
7. Pay Ratio Disclosure, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,582 (proposed Oct. 1, 2013)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249 (2016)).
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the Dodd-Frank Act became law, the SEC voted 3–28 to propose rules
to implement the pay ratio disclosure provision.9 Section 953(b) of the
Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to amend existing executive com-
pensation disclosure rules to require certain publicly traded compa-
nies to disclose in a wide range of its SEC filings, including
registration statements, annual reports and proxy statements:
1) the median of the annual total compensation of all employees
other than the chief executive officer (“median employee pay”);
2) the annual total compensation of the chief executive officer
(“CEO pay”); and
3) the ratio of the annual total compensation of the median em-
ployee to the annual total compensation of the chief executive
officer (“pay ratio”).10
According to the SEC’s press release, the intended purpose behind
Section 953(b) and the final pay ratio rule is to provide investors with
another piece of information to consider when determining whether
the compensation of their chief executive officer (“CEO”) is
appropriate.11
The mission of the SEC is to “protect investors, maintain fair, or-
derly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”12 Inter-
pretations of the mission statement suggest that the SEC’s proxy
disclosure rules for public companies are intended to provide inves-
tors with material information—information to “educate investors and
promote their understanding of a company’s executive compensation
practices so that they can make better investment decisions.”13 But
many argue that a pay ratio is not material information, and obliging
companies to calculate and disclose information about the disparities
between executive and median worker pay will do little to advance the
SEC’s core mission of investor protection.14 In formulating the Pay
Ratio Disclosure Rule (“the Rule”), the SEC did not investigate
8. The Securities and Exchange Commission is run by five President-appointed
Commissioners, who vote on enforcement actions and rulemaking. See Current SEC
Commissioners, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/com
missioner.shtml [https://perma.cc/RCW7-NBJ5].
9. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules for Pay Ratio
Disclosure (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRe
lease/1370539817895 [https://perma.cc/DJ4D-69R7].
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l). Collectively, this information is referred to as the “pay ratio disclosure.”
11. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio
Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [https:/
/perma.cc/66UV-PT6M] [hereinafter Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio
Disclosure].
12. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/R5X4-B2KW].
13. Pay Ratio, CTR. ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, http://www.execcomp.org/Is-
sues/Issue/pay-ratio [https://perma.cc/NB9R-LCM7].
14. Id.
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whether or how investors would use this information in practice.15
There are several legitimate questions about the effectiveness of the
Rule; therefore, understanding it and its implications is critical before
coming to a conclusion.
Companies should not be forced to publicize certain information if
such disclosure is intended merely to “name and shame” companies
into limiting CEO pay. The various arguments in favor of the Pay Ra-
tio Disclosure Rule depend on the unexamined assumption that inves-
tors would find the median employee’s pay relevant and useful when
making their investment decisions. This Comment will closely ex-
amine the Rule and its correlation to Congress’s goals in enacting the
Dodd-Frank Act, exposing the conclusion that the true purpose be-
hind this rule was to name and shame American business executives,
not to protect investors or to prevent deception of consumers. Unless
defined benefits can be presented, Congress should promptly move to
repeal the Rule based on the reasons set forth in this Article.
This Comment challenges the intent behind, and the merits of, the
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule. Part II of this Comment summarizes the
background leading up to the promulgation of the Rule, describing
the public criticisms and media attention it generated. Part III exam-
ines the final rule in detail, highlighting the most significant changes
from the proposed rule. Part IV explains reasons why the disclosure of
the median employee’s compensation deviates substantially from the
principle of materiality. Part V discusses the flaws in the Rule, while
pointing out the potential pitfalls and consequences involved in com-
pliance with the new disclosure requirements. And finally, Part VI
concludes that the Rule is unlikely to achieve its goals and may arbi-
trarily harm investors.
II. THE RISE OF PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE
Several publications have reported the dramatic growth of CEO
pay over the past few years, which has led to heightened discussions
relating to the practices of paying corporate executives. U.S. Senator
Robert Menendez, author of the pay ratio provision in the Dodd-
Frank Act, proclaimed, “We have middle class Americans who have
gone years without seeing a pay raise, while CEO pay is soaring. This
simple benchmark will help investors monitor both how a company
treats its average workers and whether its executive pay is reasona-
15. See Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting
Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.sec
.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-on-pay-ratio-disclosure
.html [https://perma.cc/AJB2-JBDD] [hereinafter Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at
Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure].
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ble.”16 However, many critics question how this mandatory disclosure
would actually achieve greater “investor protection.”
Since the Dodd-Frank’s enactment, Section 953(b) has been the
subject of intense scrutiny and debate. This provision has generated
significant media attention and elicited substantial opinions among
companies, labor unions, and politicians over the benefits and disad-
vantages of the pay ratio. The SEC also requested public comments
on the proposed rule.17 The SEC received over 287,400 comment let-
ters—including more than 1,540 individual letters—that revealed nu-
merous concerns with the proposed rule and “the potential costs and
benefits associated with its requirements.”18
A. The Public Debate
Implementation of the pay ratio disclosure provision was obviously
not a simple task. It took the SEC more than five years from the date
of the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010 to finalize the Rule. The SEC
adopted the final rule in a split vote along party lines.19 Democratic
Commissioners Luis A. Aguilar and Kara M. Stein voted in favor of
the Rule, while Republican Commissioners Daniel Gallagher and
Michael Piwowar voted against it.20 Voting in favor of enacting the
provision, Independent Chairwoman Mary Jo White cast the tie-
breaking vote.21 The Center on Executive Compensation calls it “one
of the most contentious and conflicted rulemakings in SEC history.”22
The proposed rules were harshly scrutinized by the two dissenting
SEC commissioners, with Commissioner Piwowar stating that the
SEC’s rule “unambiguously harms investors, negatively affects com-
petition, promotes inefficiencies, and restricts capital formation.”23 In
his dissenting statement, Commissioner Gallagher strongly urged in-
16. Press Release, Bob Menendez for New Jersey, Menendez Applauds SEC
Movement on Disclosing CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.me-
nendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-applauds-sec-movement-on-dis-
closing-ceo-to-worker-pay-ratios [https://perma.cc/5TU5-CNUJ].
17. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,108 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (“[W]hether the proposed rule would address sufficiently
the practical difficulties of data collection, whether other alternative approaches con-
sistent with Section 953(b) could provide the potential benefits of pay ratio informa-
tion at a lower cost, and whether the proposed flexible approach would appropriately
implement Section 953(b).”).
18. Id.
19. Bill Chappell, SEC Adopts CEO Pay Ratio Rule, Five Years After It Became
Law, NPR (Aug. 5, 2015, 9:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/
05/429628037/sec-to-vote-on-requiring-companies-to-disclose-ceo-pay-ratio.
20. See Ctr. on Exec. Comp., The SEC’s Final Pay Ratio Rule: Analysis and Impli-




23. Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open
Meeting Regarding Municipal Advisors and Pay Ratio Disclosure (Sept. 18, 2013),
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vestors, public companies, and other individuals impacted by the pro-
posed rules to submit “detailed, data-heavy comments.”24 Regardless
of the added flexibility in the final rule, Commissioners Gallagher and
Piwowar were still not convinced. Each issued strong dissenting state-
ments against the Rule.25 Commissioner Piwowar issued the following
statement in regards to the final rule:
Pursuing a pay ratio rulemaking was wrong then and remains wrong
now. Today’s rulemaking implements a provision of the highly parti-
san Dodd-Frank Act that pandered to politically-connected special
interest groups and, independent of the Act, could not stand on its
own merits. I am incredibly disappointed the Commission is step-
ping into that fray.26
There have been ongoing debates about the significance and effec-
tiveness of the CEO-to-median-employee pay ratio information.
Many have objected to the Rule, arguing that it provides no economic
benefit to investors and would be difficult and costly to calculate.
Republicans in Congress have made numerous attempts to repeal the
pay ratio provision and have made efforts to pressure the SEC into
delaying the Rule’s final adoption, arguing that calculating the ratio
would be extremely complicated, expensive, and of little value to in-
vestors.27 Likewise, business organizations, major law firms, and other
opponents of the pay ratio disclosure argue that such information
would provide investors with little to no insight into the comparable
compensation practices of public companies.28 Because the median
employee’s pay fluctuates based on various factors, such as “differ-
ences in organizational structures, geographical distribution of em-
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542565153 [https://perma
.cc/KT5H-84BN].
24. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting State-
ment of Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher Concerning the Proposal of Rules to
Implement the Section 953(b) Pay Ratio Disclosure Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/13705425588
73 [https://perma.cc/P7CQ-6X4Y].
25. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dissenting
Statement at an Open Meeting to Adopt the “Pay Ratio” Rule (Aug. 5, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-statement-at-open-meeting-to-adopt-the-pay-
ratio-rule.html [https://perma.cc/D68S-WTHH]; see also Michael S. Piwowar,
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Additional Dissenting Comments on Pay Ratio
Disclosure (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/additional-dissenting-
statement-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/2DCX-WJXM].
26. Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Pay Ratio Disclosure,
supra note 15. R
27. See Patrick Temple-West, SEC Agenda 2015: Swaps, ‘Pay Ratio’ and New Re-
publican Oversight, POLITICO (Jan. 2, 2015, 1:04 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2015/01/sec-agenda-2015-swaps-pay-ratio-and-new-republican-oversight-113925
[https://perma.cc/UPM8-PNTM].
28. Kevin Douglas & Andrea Orr, SEC’s Proposed CEO Pay Ratio Rules Provide
Companies with Flexibility to Satisfy Dodd-Frank Mandate, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept.
27, 2013), http://www.bna.com/secs-proposed-ceo-pay-ratio-rules-provide-companies-
with-flexibility-to-satisfy-dodd-frank-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/BV3A-CCNC].
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ployees and degree of reliance on seasonal and outsourced workers,”
opponents maintain that the data used primarily relates to the size and
structure of a company’s workforce rather than to the size of its
CEO’s pay or the company’s financial performance.29 They also argue
that any value to investors from the ratio is far outweighed by the
challenges and time-consuming efforts of calculating the median em-
ployee pay, particularly for companies that have large diverse
workforces, multinational operations, and multiple payroll and other
compensation systems.30
Conversely, Democrats have pressured the SEC to accelerate its
implementation of the pay ratio provision.31 Unions, labor advocates,
and other supporters of the pay ratio disclosure claim that the pay
ratio is in fact material information for investors.32 They argue that
the increase in income disparity between CEO pay and that of the
median worker has a direct impact on employee morale and produc-
tivity which leads to a negative effect on the overall corporate
profitability.33
Commenters that supported the proposed rule expected that it
would: inform investors about CEO compensation matters, specifi-
cally with regard to say-on-pay voting; demonstrate a company’s focus
on its long-term health as opposed to short-term gains that benefit its
CEO at the expense of its investors; discourage the pay practices that
led to the 2008 financial crisis; reduce the inequitable wealth distribu-
tion in the U.S.; and highlight potential problems in a company due to
the negative impact of a high pay ratio on employee morale and pro-
ductivity.34 However, several of these individuals supported the pro-
posed rule’s inclusion of all employees, which included non-U.S.
employees.35 In other words, they supported the idea of adopting the
rule based on a strict interpretation of Section 953(b).36 After the
SEC’s proposal of the final rule, commenters asserted that the flexibil-
ity built into the rule gave companies too much latitude to create a
methodology for identifying its median employee.37 They claim that
allowing companies to calculate the pay ratio in the way that best suits
their particular business structures, permits them to manipulate the
ratio in their favor, and therefore such information, in essence, will be
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Temple-West, supra note 27. R
32. Douglas & Orr, supra note 28. R
33. Id.
34. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,109 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
35. Id. at 50,120.
36. “[T]he median of the annual total compensation of all employees of the issuer
. . . .” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 953(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l) (emphasis added).
37. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,109.
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distorted.38 Despite the steps taken by the SEC to reduce compliance
costs, companies and other market participants continue to express
their concerns that the Rule creates an added costly burden on com-
panies who must invest time and resources to accurately prepare the
disclosure, without providing any useful information to investors.39
Given the Rule’s more flexible approach, it raises critical questions
and concerns as to whether the pay ratio disclosure would in fact be as
useful and relevant as supporters had hoped for. Even those in favor
of addressing the inequities in income have questioned whether the
disclosure would actually limit excessive executive compensation, ar-
guing that the Rule’s flexibility would substantially diminish any po-
tential usefulness of the disclosure.40 These concerns addressed by
supporters regarding the Rule’s overall effectiveness suggest that the
pay ratio disclosure does not provide information that would be help-
ful to investors when making their assessments about a company’s fi-
nancial health and future profitability.
B. What Is the Underlying Purpose Behind the
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule?
After signing the most sweeping financial industry reform legisla-
tion since the Great Depression into law, President Obama vowed
that the new law would bring the strongest financial protections for
consumers and would put an end to reviled bank bailouts.41 Based on
President Obama’s remarks at the signing, it is apparent that the pri-
mary purpose behind the Dodd-Frank Act is to reform the existing
financial system to prevent the recurrence of events that caused the
2008 financial crisis.42 However, it remains unclear what Congress had
intended to achieve in enacting the pay ratio provision.43 Notably, in
promulgating the Rule, the SEC recognized the indefiniteness of Con-
gress’s core mission. In its final rule, it stated that “Congress did not
expressly state the specific objectives or intended benefits of Section
953(b), and the legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act also does
not expressly state the Congressional purpose underlying Section
953(b).”44
Based on the SEC’s interpretation of the statute and the comments
it received, the SEC majority believes that the Congressional intended
38. Id. at 50,117.
39. See id. at 50,120.
40. See id. at 50,132–33.
41. See Remarks at the Signing of Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1. R
42. Id.
43. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,150 (“[W]hile neither the statute nor
the related legislative history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the
provision, we believe . . . that Section 953(b) was intended to provide shareholders
with a company-specific metric that can assist in their evaluation of . . . executive
compensation practices.”).
44. Id. at 50,105.
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purpose of the pay ratio disclosure was to increase transparency by
providing investors with additional information with which to make
informed decisions when exercising their say-on-pay voting rights
under Section 951.45 But the numerous responses from commenters
have failed to specify the intended objective of the pay ratio. In adopt-
ing the final rule, the SEC noted its assumption that the purpose of
the pay ratio disclosure is to provide investors with a company-specific
metric that they can use to evaluate the CEO’s compensation “within
the context of their company” rather than “to facilitate a comparison
of this information from one [company] to another.”46 Concluding
that it is “apparent” that Congress had already determined the pay
ratio disclosure to be useful as a data point for investors to use in
making their voting decisions on executive compensation, the SEC
majority adopted the final rule47 without ascertaining its true value to
investors. To that effect, the SEC finalized the Rule based on precon-
ceptions and speculation rather than on empirical data.
The final rule reflects the SEC’s attempt to address the purpose be-
hind its statutory directive under Section 953(b) while providing flexi-
bility and accommodations in a manner that it believes will ease the
costs and burdens for companies subjected to this requirement.48 Con-
sidering the release describing the Rule is a 294-page document,49 it is
evident that implementation is not going to be as straightforward as it
may appear. In effect, the Rule is much more complex, and it raises
legitimate doubts as to whether the objectives expressed by the
SEC—to increase investor protection—will be achieved.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE
A. General Highlights of the Final Rule
After a long delay and after overcoming significant resistance from
business advocates, the SEC finally approved its final rule in a narrow
3–2 vote on August 5, 2015, five years after the Dodd-Frank’s enact-
ment.50 The final rule added new paragraph (u) to Item 402 of Regu-
45. Id. at 50,106. In general, say-on-pay rules give investors the right to vote on
executive compensation at publicly-traded companies; however, management does
not necessarily have to listen since the votes are advisory and nonbinding. See OFFICE
OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Investor Bulletin: Say-
on-Pay and Golden Parachute Votes 1 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
sayonpay.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YFT-XVUR].
46. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,106.
47. Id. at 50,107.
48. Id.
49. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act Releases Nos. 33-9877; 34-75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 5, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9877.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5P4-3U6L].
50. Chappell, supra note 19. R
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lation S-K51 to implement its statutory directive under Section 953(b),
which requires publicly traded companies to disclose in their SEC fil-
ings the ratio of the compensation of the CEO to that of the median
employee.52
Although the final rule became effective on October 19, 2015, com-
panies are not required to report the pay ratio disclosure until their
first full fiscal year beginning on or after January 1, 2017.53 The pay
ratio will have to be included in all SEC filings in which executive
compensation disclosure is required by Item 402 of Regulation S-K
(e.g., Form 10-K, proxy and information statements, and registration
statements).
As many supporters of the Rule have failed to acknowledge, calcu-
lating the pay ratio is not as simple as it may sound. Although the
Rule is simply described, its implementation is a complicated task.54
In the most basic terms, in order to calculate the ratio companies must
first determine its employee population. Once the employee popula-
tion is determined, the median employee (i.e., the point at which half
the employees earn more and half earn less) must be identified. Once
identified, such employee’s annual total compensation can then be
calculated in accordance with the Summary Compensation Table as
calculated under Item 402(c)(2)(x) of Regulation S-K.55 However,
digging into the data, and considering the complex factors that influ-
ence the numbers, it’s clear the pay ratio can be complicated to calcu-
late and interpret.56
While the final rule’s overall framework is largely similar to the
SEC’s proposed rule issued in September 2013, the final rule contains
a few notable revisions that are intended to help reduce the compli-
ance costs and burdens of companies that are subjected to the require-
ment.57 The most criticized revision deals with the identification of the
median employee. In adopting the final rule, the SEC decided to allow
each company the flexibility to determine its own method of calculat-
51. In general, Item 402 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of the compensa-
tion of high-ranking executives in publicly-traded companies. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402
(2016).
52. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l).
53. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,104.
54. See, e.g., Stephen Miller, Determining CEO Pay Ratio Isn’t So Simple, SHRM
(Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/
pages/ceo-pay-ratio.aspx [https://perma.cc/32LG-UU5Y].
55. In general, the Summary Compensation Table displays a comprehensive over-
view of a company’s executive pay practices. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2016).
56. See Miller, supra note 54. R
57. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,107 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249 (2016)).
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ing its median employee’s annual compensation.58 The following sec-
tion provides a brief summary of the significant changes from the
proposed rule.
B. Key Changes from the Proposed Rule
The primary concern addressed in the comment letters was poten-
tially high compliance costs.59 When drafting the Rule, the SEC took
into consideration the rationale and views of many commenters that
the compliance costs associated with the disclosure requirement could
be significant for many companies, and compliance with a strict inter-
pretation of Section 953(b) would be nearly impossible.60 Responding
to these concerns, the SEC declined to propose a specific pay ratio
calculation method, instead adopting a rule which gives companies the
freedom to choose a method to identify their median employee and
calculate the employee’s median pay in a manner that is suitable for
the size and composition of their businesses and compensation
structures.61
This relaxed approach generated supporters’ concerns about the
Rule’s overall effectiveness while opponents continue to argue that
the required disclosure would not provide the benefits sufficient to
justify the compliance costs.62 Therefore, the key changes made to the
original rule were designed to alleviate the overall compliance costs
associated with the pay ratio disclosure while remaining consistent
with Section 953(b).63
1. Definition of “Employee”
The final rule defines “employee” to include all worldwide full-
time, part-time, seasonal, and temporary employees employed by the
company or any of the company’s consolidated subsidiaries.64 The fi-
nal rule retains the requirement that all U.S., non-U.S., full-time, part-
time, seasonal, and temporary workers must be included in the calcu-
lation.65 However, unlike the initial rule proposal, the SEC provides
two tailored exemptions for non-U.S. employees from the definition
of “employee.”66 In other words, companies can exclude their employ-
ees located outside the United States from the median-employee pay
calculation in two instances.
58. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,135 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402
(2016)).
59. See id. at 50,110.
60. See id. at 50,150, 50,157–58.
61. See supra Section III.A.
62. See supra Section II.A.
63. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,107.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2016).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(2)(i).
66. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,111 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)
(2016)).
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The first exemption is referred to as the data privacy exemption.67
In this instance, the definition of “employees” does not apply to work-
ers who are employed in a foreign jurisdiction where its data privacy
laws or regulations prevent a company from gathering the information
necessary to prepare its pay ratio disclosure.68 To qualify for this ex-
emption, the company must first make “reasonable efforts” to collect
the required compensation data.69 The Rule provides that such efforts
would involve seeking an exemption under the applicable jurisdic-
tion’s data privacy laws and using that exemption if it is granted.70 The
Rule also requires the company to disclose additional information if it
uses the data privacy exemption.71
The second exemption is known as the de minimis exemption.72 For
this exemption to apply, a company must have a non-U.S. employee
workforce that makes up 5% or less of the total employee base of the
company and its consolidated subsidiaries.73 Such company may
choose to exclude all of those non-U.S. employees when determining
the median employee but is not allowed to exclude only a portion of
its non-U.S. workforce.74 If more than 5% of a company’s workforce
is made up of non-U.S. employees, the company may exclude up to
5% of those employees; however, it must exclude all employees lo-
cated in a specific jurisdiction.75 In other words, the company cannot
exclude a subset of employees from one jurisdiction and employees
from other jurisdictions to meet the 5% threshold.76 Disclosure of ad-
ditional information is required if a company chooses to use this
exemption.77
Non-U.S. employees excluded from the definition of “employee”
under the data privacy exemption would count against the 5% de
minimis threshold.78 A company may exclude any non-U.S. employee
that meets the data privacy exemption.79 But if the number of ex-
cluded employees under the data privacy exemption equals or exceeds
5% of total employees, the company cannot use the de minimis ex-
emption to exclude additional employees.80
67. Id. at 50,123 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(i) (2016)).




72. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,124 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(u)(4)(ii) (2016)).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(ii) (2016).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,124.
77. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(ii) (2016).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4)(ii)(A).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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2. Identification of the Median Employee
The final rule retained the flexibility of the proposed rule, which
allows companies to determine the median employee from among the
total employee population, a statistical sample, or any other reasona-
ble method.81 However, the final rule authorizes companies the addi-
tional flexibility to choose any method to identify the median
employee based on their own facts and circumstances.82
The Rule provides that a company may identify its median em-
ployee in the population or sample using annual total compensation
or any other consistently applied compensation measure, such as com-
pensation amounts reported in its payroll or tax records.83 In addition,
the final rule also allows companies to use reasonable estimates in
calculating the annual total compensation or any elements of compen-
sation for employees other than the CEO.84 In any event, the com-
pany must disclose the methodology used, and any estimates or
assumptions made.85
3. Use of the Identified Median Employee
Companies are allowed to select a date within the last three months
of their last-completed fiscal year on which to determine the em-
ployee population for purposes of identifying their median employee,
instead of the last day of the company’s last completed fiscal year as
was in the proposal.86 In addition, the final rule provides that the me-
dian employee only has to be identified once every three years, in-
stead of every year, as long as no changes have occurred in the
company’s employee compensation arrangements or employee popu-
lation that the company reasonably believes would significantly im-
pact the pay ratio.87 If the median employee departs from the
company or his position changes, the company may use another em-
ployee with compensation that is substantially similar to that of the
median employee.88
4. Calculation of the Median Employee Pay
The final rule allows companies to make cost-of-living adjustments
for employees outside of the jurisdiction in which the CEO resides in
order to reflect the cost of living applicable in the jurisdiction where
81. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,135 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)).
82. Id. at 50,130 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,112 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)).
87. Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2016)).
88. Id.
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the CEO resides.89 If the company chooses to use a cost-of-living ad-
justment to identify the median employee, and the median employee
is in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the CEO re-
sides, the company must use the same adjustment in calculating the
total compensation paid to the median employee and disclose the me-
dian employee’s jurisdiction.90 In addition, the company will also need
to disclose the following: (1) a brief description of the cost-of-living
adjustments used; (2) the median employee’s annual total compensa-
tion without the cost-of-living adjustment; and (3) the pay ratio with-
out the cost-of-living adjustment.91
5. Calculation of the CEO Pay
The final rule provides two different methods for calculating the
CEO annual total compensation when a company has had more than
one CEO during its fiscal year.92 The first method is to combine the
compensation of each individual who served as CEO during the year
for time served as CEO.93 The second method is to look to the indi-
vidual serving as CEO on the date the company selects, and identify
the median employee and annualize that CEO’s compensation.94 Re-
gardless of which method is used, the company must disclose which
method it chose and disclose how it calculated its CEO’s annual total
compensation.95
If a CEO’s salary or bonus is not yet determined, the company may
omit its disclosure until such amounts are calculable and disclose
when this is expected.96 Thus, the pay ratio disclosure is only required
when the CEO’s salary or bonus becomes calculable in whole.97
6. Postponement of Compliance Date
Each company subject to the Rule will be required to report its pay
ratio information for its first fiscal year. The final rule postpones the
initial date of compliance with the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule until the
first fiscal year beginning on or after January 1, 2017.98 Thus, compa-
nies must include their 2017 pay ratio disclosures in their 2018 re-
ports.99 This transition rule also applies to companies that cease to be
smaller reporting companies or emerging growth companies, as well








97. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,146 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2016)).
98. Id. at 50,112 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
99. See id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
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as companies engaging in business combinations or acquisitions (i.e.,
IPOs).100
C. In-Depth Look at the Final Rule
The changes in the final rule were primarily made to resolve the
concerns regarding the burden of compliance costs as weighed against
the lack of benefits that could be identified. Prior to the adoption of
the final rule, the SEC estimated that the overall initial compliance
costs for all companies subject to the Rule could be as high as $1.3
billion the first year101 and $526 million per year thereafter.102 To gain
a better understanding of the Rule’s implications, the following seg-
ments will discuss the Rule in greater detail.
1. Companies Not Subject to Disclosure
New Item 402(u) of Regulation S-K applies only to companies re-
quired to prepare a summary compensation table pursuant to Item
402(c) of Regulation S-K.103 Therefore, the pay ratio rule would not
apply to the following: (1) smaller reporting companies;104 (2) emerg-
ing growth companies;105 (3) foreign private investors;106 or (4) U.S.-
Canadian Multijurisdictional Disclosure System filers.107
100. See id. at 50,113 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
101. Id. at 50,161.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 50,115 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
104. Id. What constitutes as a “smaller reporting company” is defined in Item
10(f)(1) of Regulation S-K. A “smaller reporting company” is an issuer that “[h]ad a
public float of less than $75 million as of the last business day of its most recently
completed second fiscal quarter” or “had annual revenues of less than $50 million
during the most recently completed fiscal year for which audited financial statements
are available.” See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f)(1) (2016).
105. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,115 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)). Defined in Section 3(a) of the Exchange Act, an “emerging growth com-
pany” is an issuer that (1) had total annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion
during its most recently completed fiscal year; (2) has not reached the fifth anniver-
sary of the date of the first sale of its common equity securities pursuant to an effec-
tive registration statement under the Securities Act; (3) had not issued $1 billion in
non-convertible debt during the previous three-year period; or (4) is deemed to be a
“large accelerated filer.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2015).
106. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,115 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)
(2016)). A “foreign private investor” is any foreign issuer other than a foreign govern-
ment, except for a registrant that, as of the last business day of its most recent fiscal
year, has more than 50% of its outstanding voting securities held of record by United
States residents and any of the following: a majority of its officers and directors are
citizens or residents of the United States, more than 50% of its assets are located in
the United States, or its business is principally administered in the United States. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.3b–4(c) (2016).
107. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,115. A U.S.-Canadian Multijurisdic-
tional Disclosure System (“MJDS”) filer is a registrant that files annual reports and
registration statements on Form 40-F in accordance with the requirements of the
MJDS. Id. at 50,114.
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2. Identifying the Median Employee
The Rule requires a company to identify its median employee once
every three years and calculate the total compensation of that em-
ployee once each year, provided that there has not been a “change in
its employee population or employee compensation arrangements
that it reasonably believes would result in a significant change to its
pay ratio disclosure.”108 If no such changes are made the following
year, a company is required to disclose that it is using the same me-
dian employee in its pay ratio calculation and must briefly describe
the basis for its belief that there were no changes that would signifi-
cantly affect its pay ratio disclosure.109 For any year in which a com-
pany believes a significant change has occurred, it must re-identify its
median employee.110 Regardless of whether the company uses the me-
dian employee identified during the prior year, it must calculate that
median employee’s annual total compensation each year and use the
updated figure to calculate its pay ratio.111
A company may select any date within the last three months of its
last completed fiscal year to identify its median employee.112 When
identifying the median employee, a company must include all full-
time, part-time, seasonal, and temporary employees of the company
and its consolidated subsidiaries, whether located in the U.S. or over-
seas, and without regard to whether the individual is on salary or
hourly pay.113 However, individuals who provide services to the com-
pany or any of its consolidated subsidiaries as independent contractors
or leased workers are not included in the pay ratio calculation, as long
as they are employed and their compensation is determined by an un-
affiliated third party.114 Companies are not permitted to voluntarily
include independent contractors or leased workers in their pay ratio
calculations “if such persons make up a significant portion of the
workforce.”115 However, companies may discuss their reliance on
leased workers in their narrative disclosures and may also provide ad-
ditional ratios that include such workers, “as long as any additional
ratios are not misleading and are not more prominently displayed
than the required ratio.”116
Although employees employed in a foreign jurisdiction are included
in the Rule’s definition of “employee,” the Rule provides two exemp-
108. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,130 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2016).
113. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,117–18 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(u)(2)–(4) (2016)).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(3) (2016).
115. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,118.
116. Id. (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\4-3\TWL305.txt unknown Seq: 17  2-JUN-17 13:23
2017]COULD THE PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE BACKFIRE? 433
tions for excluding non-U.S. employees in certain circumstances.117 As
mentioned earlier, reporting companies may exclude individuals who
fall under the Rule’s data privacy exemption or de minimis exemption
from their pay ratio calculations.118 In addition, a company may ex-
clude any employees of a newly acquired entity in the year a business
combination or acquisition occurs.119
When identifying the median employee, companies are not required
to calculate total compensation for every employee in the same man-
ner as required for the CEO. As mentioned earlier, the Rule instead
allows a company to select an appropriate methodology for identify-
ing its median employee and use reasonable estimates based upon its
particular facts and circumstances.120 In determining which employees
will be used to identify the median, a company has the flexibility to
use any of the following approaches: (1) its employee population; (2)
statistical sampling; or (3) other reasonable methods.121 The company
must disclose any material assumptions, adjustments, or estimates it
used.122
The Rule does not require a company to use a specific compensa-
tion measure in identifying its median employee. Rather, a company
may identify its median employee based on any compensation mea-
sure that is consistently applied to all employees.123 For example, a
company may use information derived from its payroll or tax records
to identify its median employee (e.g., base salary, total cash compen-
sation, and W-2 earnings).124 A company may use a measure that is
defined differently across jurisdictions and may use the same annual
period that is used in the records from which such compensation is
derived.125 In other words, the median employee can be identified us-
ing any reasonable definition of compensation as long as it is consist-
ently applied to all employees and is disclosed with the pay ratio.126
The Rule further provides additional flexibility by allowing a re-
porting company to make certain adjustments when identifying the
median employee. A company may annualize compensation for its
permanent part-time and full-time employees who were not employed
during the entire fiscal year, but may not annualize the compensation
of its seasonal or temporary employees or make any full-time adjust-
ments for its part-time employees.127 Also, a company may make cost-
117. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(4) (2016).
118. See supra Section III.B.1.
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016); see also supra Section III.C.1.
120. See supra Section III.B.2.






127. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (Instruction 5 to Item 402(u)).
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of-living adjustments to the compensation of employees in jurisdic-
tions other than the jurisdiction in which the CEO resides.128 These
adjustments must be consistently applied to all employees of a juris-
diction where any adjustment is made.129
The median employee must be an actual, individual employee.130
Companies are not required to, and should not, identify the median
employee by name or use any other personally identifiable informa-
tion other than that employee’s annual total compensation.131 How-
ever, companies may choose to disclose the median employee’s
position in general to place the compensation in context, but the Rule
specifies that companies should not do so if providing the information
could identify any specific individual.132
3. Calculating Annual Total Compensation of the Median
Employee and CEO
The Rule requires a company to calculate the annual total compen-
sation for both its CEO and median employee using the requirements
in Regulation S-K Item 402(c)(2)(x).133 Regulation S-K Item
402(c)(2)(x) sets forth the calculation of “annual total compensation”
of a public company’s named executive officers for purposes of the
Summary Compensation Table, which is typically included in an an-
nual meeting proxy statement.134 “Total compensation” as applied to
the median employee has the same meaning as in the compensation
disclosure rules that apply to named executive officers.135 Therefore,
the annual total compensation for both the CEO and median em-
ployee must be calculated for the company’s last completed fiscal year
and in accordance with Item 402(c)(2)(x).
MEDIAN EMPLOYEE PAY. Once the median employee has been
identified, the company must gather applicable compensation data
and make necessary assumptions to calculate the annual total com-
pensation in accordance with the Summary Compensation Table ele-
ments under Item 402(c)(2)(x).136 In recognizing that the factors of
the median employee’s compensation may vary from those of named
executive officers, the Rule allows companies to use reasonable esti-
mates when valuing the elements of its median employee’s total com-
128. See supra Section III.B.4.
129. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 4 to Item 402(u)).
130. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,137 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(u)(3) (2016)).
131. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 11 to Item 402(u)).
132. Id.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(1).
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)(x).
135. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,139 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(u)(2) (2016)).
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016).
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pensation.137 While the SEC has not recommended what a reasonable
estimate would be, the Rule only requires that companies “must have
a reasonable basis to conclude that their estimates approximate the
actual amounts of Item 402(c)(2)(x) compensation . . . paid to the me-
dian employee” and “must clearly identify any estimates used.”138
For non-salaried employees, references in the rules to “base salary”
and “salary” will refer to “wages plus overtime” instead.139 For non-
U.S. employees, any accrued pension benefits paid by the government
under a government-mandated pension plan (i.e. Social Security bene-
fits) are not considered compensation for purposes of Item 402 nor
are they included in the calculation of total compensation.140
CEO PAY. For purposes of the pay ratio, the Rule allows companies
to select one of two methods for calculating the CEO’s total compen-
sation when a CEO is hired mid-year.141 Where more than one person
has served as CEO during the year, the company may choose either of
the following methods:
1) calculate the total compensation pursuant to Item 402(c)(2)(x)
for each CEO that served during that fiscal year and combine
those figures; or
2) use the total compensation for the CEO serving in that position
on the date the company has selected to identify the company’s
median employee and annualize that CEO’s compensation.142
For purposes of the CEO compensation, total compensation does
not include only cash payment, but also includes the grant-date value
of stock options and other equity awards, the cumulative change in
pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation earnings, and
the value of certain other compensation, including personal
benefits.143
4. Content and Format of the Disclosure
In reporting the pay ratio, companies are permitted to present the
information in one of two ways: first, to express the ratio numerically,
with the median employee’s annual total compensation equal to one
and the CEO’s compensation presented as the number compared to
one (e.g., 100 to 1)144 and second, to report the pay ratio narratively
137. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,560, 60,573–74 (proposed Oct. 1,
2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016) (Instruction 4 to Item 402(u)).
138. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,139 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)(2)(i) (2016).
140. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,140.
141. See supra Section III.B.5.
142. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 10 to Item 402(u)).
143. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2016).
144. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,113 (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.402(u)(1)(iii) (2016)).
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by stating how many times higher or lower the CEO’s annual total
compensation is than that of the median employee (e.g., “the CEO’s
annual total compensation is 100 times that of the median of the an-
nual total compensation of all its employees”).145
The Rule also allows companies to supplement the required disclo-
sure with additional ratios or other information that it believes will
help investors understand its pay ratio disclosure, provided that any
additional ratios are “clearly identified, not misleading, and not
presented with greater prominence than the required ratio.”146
5. Additional Disclosure Requirements
The Rule also requires companies to disclose certain information
beyond its pay ratio. Companies must disclose and briefly describe the
methodology used to identify the median employee and any material
assumptions, adjustments, estimates, and/or exclusions used to iden-
tify the median employee or to determine the total compensation or
any elements thereof.147 This includes modifications related to cost-of-
living, non-U.S. employees, and business combinations or acquisi-
tions.148 Companies must clearly identify the estimates used.149 To the
extent a company changes its methodology or adjustments from the
previous year, it must describe the modification as well as reasons for
making such change if the effects of the change are material.150
6. Timing of Disclosure
Companies subject to the Rule will not be required to report pay
ratio information until the 2018 proxy season.151 Each company will
be required to calculate its pay ratio for its first fiscal year that begins
on or after January 1, 2017, and report that information in the follow-
ing year’s proxy statement.152 Similar to the requirements for execu-
tive compensation in proxy statements, the pay ratio disclosure must
be filed no later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year.153
The Rule provides transition periods for certain public companies
where such companies can defer reporting their pay ratios. A com-
pany that had not previously been a reporting company would be re-
quired to report its pay ratio for the first fiscal year following the year
in which it becomes a reporting company.154 These transition rules ap-
145. Id.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 9 to Item 402(u)).
147. See supra Section III.C.2.
148. See supra Section III.C.2.
149. See supra Section III.C.3.
150. See supra Section III.C.2.
151. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,147 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
152. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 7 to Item 402(u)).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (Instruction 3 to Item 402(u)).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (Instruction 7 to Item 402(u)).
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ply to newly public companies,155 companies ceasing to be smaller re-
porting companies or emerging growth companies,156 and companies
engaging in business combinations or acquisitions.157
Newly public companies (i.e. IPOs) subject to the Rule are not re-
quired to report their pay ratios until the first fiscal year beginning on
or after the date that they become subject to the requirements of Sec-
tion 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.158 Smaller reporting compa-
nies and emerging growth companies are exempt from the Rule until
the first fiscal year beginning on or after the date that such company
exits its status as a smaller reporting company or emerging growth
company.159 A company engaged in a business combination or acqui-
sition may exclude individuals who become employees as a result of
the acquisition or combination from its pay ratio calculation for the
fiscal year in which the transaction became effective.160 However,
such a company must identify the acquired business and disclose the
approximate number of employees it is omitting.161
IV. FAILS THE TEST OF MATERIALITY
Deviation from the principle of materiality results in excessive costs
and burdens to companies, harms investors, and distracts the SEC
from its core statutory mission. The congressional mandate under Sec-
tion 953(b) requires the SEC to implement a rule that is beyond the
scope of its mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”162 As a result, the
legislation of the pay ratio disclosure requirement ignored whether
the information is in fact material to investors in making informed
investing or voting decisions. It is yet another instance of Congress’s
use of federal securities laws to address alleged societal issues that
have no important bearing upon investment and voting decisions.
A. The Scope of Disclosure Regulations Lies
in the Materiality Standard
Financial and business disclosure is the underpinning of federal se-
curities law. The power granted to the SEC is to promulgate disclo-
sure rules that would provide investors with the material information
they need to make informed investment and voting decisions. The ef-
fectiveness of disclosure should be measured by the degree to which
155. Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,147 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u)
(2016)).
156. Id. at 50,148 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
157. Id. at 50,149 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016)).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2016) (Instruction 7 to Item 402(u)).
159. Id. (Instruction 7, 8 to Item 402(u)).
160. Id. (Instruction 7 to Item 402(u)).
161. Id.
162. What We Do, supra note 12. R
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the disclosure helps investors understand and evaluate a company
when making investment decisions. An effective disclosure provides
all investors the information that they need but does not overpower
them with superfluous information that can obscure what is material
and distract investors from what really matters about a company.163
Since securities laws were enacted, specifically in more recent years,
the disclosure documents that companies file with the SEC have con-
tinued to grow in length—which is reflected by the extensive annual
reports on Form 10-K and proxy statements that are provided to in-
vestors. Recognizing the negative impact that information overload
has on the effectiveness of disclosure, the SEC recently issued a con-
cept release for the purpose of developing recommendations to up-
date and enhance the scope of its disclosure requirements.164
According to SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White, the number and type
of issues that companies must disclose have grown to be “more and
more detailed.”165 She went on further to question whether investors
need or are well-served by all that kind of information.166 As Chair-
woman White explained:
When disclosure gets to be “too much” or strays from its core pur-
pose, it could lead to what some have called “information over-
load”—a phenomenon in which ever-increasing amounts of
disclosure make it difficult for an investor to wade through the vol-
ume of information she receives to ferret out the information that is
most relevant.167
Based on its release, the SEC is well-aware of the concern that current
disclosure documents are filled with too much information that is out-
dated, unnecessarily repetitive, or otherwise not useful to investors.168
Disclosures are less effective when investors become overloaded
with extraneous information that is not useful—making it difficult and
confusing for investors to identify the important information about a
company. For example, a study of institutional investors conducted by
Stanford University in 2015 revealed that the majority found proxy
statements to be too long and difficult to read, and only a third of the
163. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Path Forward
on Disclosure, Remarks at the National Association of Corporate Directors Leader-
ship Conference (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370539878806 [https://perma.cc/2SMK-YSJM] [hereinafter The Path Forward on
Disclosure].
164. See generally Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K,
Securities Act Release No. 33-10064, Exchange Act Release No. 34-77,599, 81 Fed.
Reg. 23915 (proposed Apr. 13, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230,
232, 239, 240, 249).
165. See The Path Forward on Disclosure, supra note 163. R
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 23,917.
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information disclosed was relevant.169 Even former SEC Commis-
sioner Troy A. Paredes has pointed out that investors may decide to
ignore dense, lengthy documents altogether as they find much of the
information unhelpful or too time consuming to sort through.170 This
problem becomes worse when disclosures become too excessive and
convoluted.171 An expansive disclosure document is unlikely to help
an investor make an informed decision and can result in even worse
decisions.172 Therefore, the test of materiality should be applied to
ensure that expanded disclosure rules help investors make better-in-
formed investment and voting decisions.
The scope of disclosure regulations is fundamentally grounded on
the standard of materiality, which helps filter out irrelevant informa-
tion. The concept of materiality has long been the “dividing line” for
determining what should be disclosed and what should not have to be
disclosed under the federal securities law.173 Forty years ago, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to find that a fact is material just because an
investor might find it important.174 The Court held that a fact is “ma-
terial” if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”175 The
Court explained the harms of a low materiality standard, stating:
[N]ot only may the corporation and its management be subjected to
liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements, but also man-
agement’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it
simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial informa-
tion—a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision
making.176
Concerned with the unintended and harmful consequences resulting
from information overload, the Court therefore adopted a more strin-
gent test of materiality—making it clear that the focus should be on
information relevant to informed investment decision-making.177
The Rule does not satisfy the test of materiality. The ratio is unnec-
essarily redundant and is otherwise not useful to investors. Such infor-
mation is already readily available to investors in order for them to
169. David F. Larcker et al., 2015 Investor Survey Deconstructing Proxy State-
ments—What Matters to Investors, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. 1 (Feb. 2015), https://
www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-survyey-2015-deconstruct-
ing-proxy-statements_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN6W-GCG7].
170. Troy A. Paredes, Information Overload and Mandatory Securities Regulation




173. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 17
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 453, 460 (2015).
174. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445–50 (1976).
175. Id. at 449.
176. Id. at 448–49.
177. Id.
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get a clearer and more complete picture of the CEO compensation.178
In 2006, the SEC began requiring companies to disclose executive
compensation of its CEOs and directors.179 Investors who do not un-
derstand the Rule’s implications will likely misinterpret the ratio and
use it to their disadvantage. For the ratio to have any real probative
value, the investor would need to gain a good understanding of what
the Rule entails. As a result, it could overwhelm the reasonable inves-
tor as he or she would simply ignore the ratio altogether, finding it to
be too time-consuming to go through the ins and outs of how the com-
pany had formulated that number.
Based on precedent, when determining the materiality of the infor-
mation, the Supreme Court has consistently based its decision upon an
objective standard of a “reasonable investor.”180 Such a threshold
helps to ensure that what is disclosed is related to advancing the goals
of the federal securities laws, as reflected in the SEC’s mission to pro-
tect investors.181
B. The Reasonable Investor Would Likely Ignore the Pay Ratio
in Investment Decisions
Because the U.S. Supreme Court does not attribute a “child-like
simplicity” to the reasonable investor when determining material-
ity,182 neither should lawmakers.183 Materiality should not be judged
on the basis of the needs of an investor who is not representative of
the general investment community or who is looking to further some
public-policy interest. The SEC’s rulemaking authority is not meant to
be used as a tool to advance policy goals that are far beyond the scope
of those reflected in its core statutory mission. Because materiality is
defined as information that a reasonable investor would regard as im-
178. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Adopt
Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation and Re-
lated Matters (July 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm
[https://perma.cc/T297-L93W].
179. Id.
180. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (reaffirming the stan-
dard of materiality). The Court in Basic Inc. held that the materiality requirement is
satisfied when there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id. (quoting TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at
449). Not long ago, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split on the materiality stan-
dard under federal securities law by reestablishing the long-standing test for material-
ity set forth twenty-nine years ago in the Basic Inc. case. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (readdressing materiality).
181. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 234.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Rea-
sonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1493, 1493 (2013) (“The
judicial view of a ‘reasonable investor’ plays an important role in federal securities
regulation. Courts express great confidence in the reasonable investor’s cognitive abil-
ities . . . .”).
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portant in making investment decisions, the SEC should maintain the
reasonable-investor standard to distinguish between material and im-
material statements when assessing disclosure requirements.
The purpose of securities law is to “protect [investors] against . . .
economic losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”184 For pur-
poses of materiality determinations in securities fraud actions, courts
have ascribed reasonable investors with certain skills and knowledge.
Professor Wendy Gerwick Couture has described the judicial view of a
“reasonable investor” as one who is able “to grasp the time-value of
money, the taxation of different investments, basic accounting treat-
ment, diversification and risk, the nature of margin accounts, and the
security industry’s compensation structure.”185 Judicial conceptions of
the “reasonable investor” suggest that any information that would af-
fect the company’s operating performance, valuation, and equity re-
turns is the type of information a reasonable investor would attach
importance to when making its investment decisions. Therefore, it
seems rational to assume that those who invest in the financial mar-
kets would have a strong incentive to undertake profitable
investments.
Instead of asking mainstream investors whether the pay ratio is ma-
terial or not, perhaps the proper question to pose is: how does the
median employee’s pay correlate with a company’s operating and
stock-price performance? Unlike the CEO compensation, there are
no studies that show how a median employee’s compensation is tied to
the company’s operating or stock-price performance. Based on a sur-
vey conducted by the Rivel Research Group, a significant majority of
investors are highly likely to vote in support of CEO compensation
plans as part of the annual say-on-pay voting process.186 Notably, the
majority reported that they are more likely to vote against a com-
pany’s compensation plan not because pay levels are egregious, but
because there is a disconnect between CEO pay and performance.187
The survey further revealed a consensus among the majority that the
pay ratio disclosure is not useful information.188 Not only do these
184. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005).
185. See Couture, supra note 173, at 479. R
186. See David F. Larcker et al., The “Buy Side” View on CEO Pay, STAN. GRADU-
ATE SCH. BUS.: STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES 2 (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.gsb
.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-60-buy-side-ceo-pay.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U379-B7CK] (“The majority of respondents in Rivel’s research
panel report voting in favor of say on pay between 70 percent and 90 percent of the
time.”).
187. Forty-two percent of the majority indicated that they are “likely to vote
against the [CEO’s compensation] plan because of a disconnect between pay and per-
formance,” whereas 25% are likely to vote against the plan due to the egregiousness
of the pay levels. Id.
188. Even if the SEC’s final rule allows for the pay ratio to be used as a comparison
tool across industries, 63% of the respondents in Rivel’s research panel believe that
this figure is an inaccurate comparison tool. Id. at 8.
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results corroborate the assumption that investors primarily seek prof-
itable investments, they also strongly suggest that the Rule was politi-
cally motivated rather than promulgated in response to investor
pressure. If the pay ratio provided meaningful insight into assessing
the value of a company, investors certainly would have been insistent
in demanding its disclosure. Is this something that investors actually
want, or is it a political issue?
An analysis of the ratios widely used by the investor community in
making investment decisions further clarifies that materiality centers
on the financial and operational performance of companies and on
investment returns for investors. The principal tools for the analysis of
a company’s financial health and its record of performance are finan-
cial ratios, which are derived from the various figures that are found in
financial statements.189 Historical empirical studies have demon-
strated the usefulness and applicability of financial statements in mak-
ing investment decisions.190 It is universally accepted in today’s
financial world that certain ratios are regularly used to gain insight
into a company’s operating performance and financial health in terms
of profitability, operational efficiency, liquidity, leverage, and market
valuation. There are several commonly used ratios for financial analy-
sis.191 The following are examples of some of these commonly ac-
cepted ratios: current ratio,192 debt-to-equity ratio,193 inventory
turnover ratio,194 operating margin,195 price-to-earnings ratio,196 divi-
189. See J. EDWARD KETZ ET AL., A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL
RATIOS: COMPARABILITIES AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 1 (1990).
190. See generally Kung H. Chen & Thomas A. Shimerda, An Empirical Analysis of
Useful Financial Ratios, 10 FIN. MGMT. 51 (1981).
191. Id.
192. The current ratio is used to determine a company’s liquidity by comparing the
proportion of current assets to the total current liabilities. See MERRILL LYNCH, HOW
TO READ A FINANCIAL REPORT 22 (2000), http://e145.stanford.edu/upload/Mer-
rill_Lynch.pdf. The concept behind this ratio is to assess whether a company’s short-
term assets are readily available to pay off its short-term liabilities. See id. In theory,
an increase in the current ratio is an indication of improved financial strength. See id.
193. Debt-to-equity ratio compares a company’s total debt to investors’ equity,
which are figures found on a company’s balance sheet. Id. at 23. This ratio is “an
indicator of whether the company is using debt excessively.” Id. For example, if a
company has a debt-to-equity ratio of 2 to 1, it means that the company is taking on
debt at twice the rate that its investors are investing in the company.
194. Inventory turnover ratio compares a company’s cost of sales on its income
statement with its average inventory balance for the period. See id. at 24. This ratio
tells an investor “how many times a year goods purchased by a company are sold to
its customers.” Id.
195. Operating margin compares a company’s operating income to net revenues,
which are figures that can be found on a company’s income statement. See id. at 30. It
shows what percentage was profit for each dollar of sales. See id.
196. Price-to-earnings ratio compares a company’s common stock price with its
earnings per share. See id. at 35. For example, if a company’s stock is selling at $25 per
share and the company is earning $2 per share, then the company’s price-to-earnings
ratio is 12.5 to 1. Id. In other words, the company’s stock is selling at 12.5 times its
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dend payout ratio,197 and dividend yield.198 The additional disclosure
of a company’s median employee pay is both irrelevant and immate-
rial, as a reasonable investor’s evaluation of a company’s financial
health and future profitability would not change based on this
information.
Likewise, an analysis of the Form 10-K reveals information regard-
ing a company’s financial health in terms of its risks and future profit-
ability.199 The Form 10-K includes information such as company
history and its business development, executive compensation, equity,
subsidiaries, organizational structure, and audited financial state-
ments.200 All of which give meaningful insights on the company’s fi-
nancial performance and financial health. The pay ratio falls outside
of this context. Information concerning how much a company pays its
median employee is neither important nor the type of information
that would help an investor assess a company’s financial health.
No single financial statement gives a complete picture, but when
combined by the use of ratio analysis, financial statements provide in-
vestors with meaningful and useful information about a company. It is
unlikely that a pay ratio would provide the same effect or become an
acceptable tool for financial analysis. A ratio between CEO and me-
dian employee pay does not give insight to a company’s financial
health. Not only are ratios used by investment professionals and the
investing public to evaluate the financial health of a specific company,
they are commonly used to compare a potential investment in one
company with that of another. Investors generally use ratios to com-
pare their company’s ratio with that of other companies in the same
industry to determine the optimal investment. The SEC has explicitly
cautioned that the Rule would not enable the public to compare the
pay ratios between different companies201—which the uninformed
reasonable investor is most likely to do when he or she sees the ratio.
earnings. Id. A high price-to-earnings ratio generally means that “investors have con-
fidence in the company’s ability to produce higher future profits.” Id. at 36.
197. Dividend payout ratio tells investors how much of the company’s profits goes
out in dividends. Id. This ratio identifies the percentage of earnings per share paid to
investors. See id. The dividend payout ratio is an indicator of how well earnings sup-
port the dividend payment. See id.
198. Dividend yield is a financial ratio that measures the amount of dividends a
company distributes to its investors in relation to the market value per share. Id. at 37.
It is generally expressed as a percentage and is calculated by dividing the company’s
annual cash dividend per share by the current market price of the stock. Id. A high
dividend yield can be an indicator that a stock is underpriced or that the company is
going through a difficult time and future dividends will not be as high as prior ones.
199. See generally Fast Answers: How to Read a 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/answers/reada10k.htm [https://perma.cc/LXF4-83X
B].
200. For related reading, see generally https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k
.pdf.
201. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,173 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249 (2016)).
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The pay ratio is a single eye-popping number that is nothing more
than a misleading number that could make investors miss a great
investment.
For these reasons, it is unconvincing that the average prudent inves-
tor would factor in a company’s median employee pay when deciding
to invest in a particular company as it is not useful for understanding
and evaluating a company. Consequently, the Rule fails the material-
ity test because there is not a substantial likelihood that reasonable
investors would consider this type of data point essential, nor useful in
their voting and investment decisions.
V. FLAWS IN THE PAY RATIO RULE
The SEC’s formula for the CEO-to-median-employee pay ratio is
flawed and unlikely to achieve the goals the SEC wants. With over
287,000 comments received by the SEC, the pay ratio proposal is one
of the most commented upon proposals in SEC history.202 Despite sig-
nificant scrutiny and opposition, the SEC elected to largely adopt the
Rule as originally proposed, leaving many of the most controversial
concerns still intact. The inclusion of only minimal revisions in the
final rule reflects the SEC’s reluctance to compromise on the contro-
versial issues posed by the Rule.
One major flaw in the SEC’s pay ratio calculation is that by using
the median employee’s compensation in the denominator of the ratio,
the SEC is inadvertently distorting the calculation. For example, Com-
pany A has five employees who are paid $20,000 a year, one employee
who is paid $50,000 a year, and five employees who are paid $80,000 a
year. The median employee pay here would be $50,000, even though
half of Company A’s employees are paid far below that amount. In
effect, this would reduce the pay ratio, which is not a reasonable rep-
resentation of the company’s corporate governance practices. It does
not appropriately reflect the performance of executives or the condi-
tion and circumstances of the businesses that they manage.
Another flaw is the SEC’s decision to allow companies leeway in
identifying the median employee. This includes the use of statistical
sampling,203 which is generally open to subjectivity and might enable
companies to game the system. For example, in a situation where the
median employee’s pay is substantially low, a high pay ratio would be
produced. In this scenario, a company could hire an additional person
on the higher end of the income distribution to increase the median,
or fire an existing employee on the lower end. Applying the facts from
the above example, that would mean the median employee pay would
202. Joe Mont, How Comment Letters Could Shape the Pay Ratio Rule, COMPLI-
ANCE WEEK (July 28, 2015), https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/
how-comment-letters-could-shape-the-pay-ratio-rule [https://perma.cc/5MUB-H2A
U].
203. See supra Section III.C.2.
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increase to $65,000, which is calculated by averaging the two middle
wages, $50,000 and $80,000. By increasing the median employee pay,
the pay ratio is further skewed, weakening the Rule’s intended objec-
tive of creating greater transparency to demonstrate how median em-
ployee pay compares with CEO compensation. Because there is a
great likelihood of producing inaccurate information based on the
Rule’s requirements, it could arbitrarily harm companies by mis-
informing investors.
As a result, the pay ratio disclosure in essence does nothing to pro-
tect investors. It was mandated to see whether it would spark new
resistance from investors and consumers, thereby arbitrarily harming
investors. The Rule itself does not carry any benchmarks or penal-
ties204—it merely puts an additional light on the growing pay dispari-
ties between CEOs and their employees. Nothing in the Rule requires
that the CEO pay should stay below some pre-determined level,
which further diminishes its effectiveness.
In addition, the disclosure of a pay ratio does not come without
compromising other aspects of a company. There is a risk that disclos-
ing pay ratio information can result in negative consequences. While
many argue that excessive executive compensation contributed to the
2008 financial crisis, governments should not regulate the level of ex-
ecutive compensation. There has been “no convincing evidence that
high levels of [CEO] compensation . . . are inherently risky for the
companies themselves or the overall economy.”205 Again, the Rule
distills CEO pay practices down to one ratio. This is troubling because
a pay ratio is not generally accepted as providing meaningful informa-
tion to investors. Therefore, the attempt to limit executive pay
through this Rule is likely to cause unintended consequences that may
actually affect companies’ business practices.
The authors of Section 953(b) may have thought that by disclosing
the ratio, public company boards would be pressured to limit compen-
sation of CEOs and to find ways to increase the salaries of their aver-
age workers. However, it will likely produce the opposite outcome. A
possible unexpected consequence of the Rule is that it could depress
employee morale, which is relevant to the productivity and function of
a company. If the ratio shows a large gap in pay between the CEO and
the rest of a company’s employees, it is likely to hurt productivity and
increase turnover, ultimately affecting profitability and investor re-
turns. The employees below the median baseline may wonder what it
204. See Pay Ratio Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,173.
205. See Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, supra note 5, at 2; see also R
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You
Pay, But How, 3 HARV. BUS. REV. 138, 138 (May 1990) (“There are serious problems
with CEO compensation, but ‘excessive’ pay is not the biggest issue. The relentless
focus on how much CEOs are paid diverts public attention from the real problem—
how CEOs are paid.”).
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takes to get them to that median pay level, and why the company is
not paying them more. Employees at or above the median may won-
der whether their pay levels are determined fairly, or possibly how the
level of CEO pay might be hindering their pay increases. Employees
may also attempt to look at other similarly situated companies and
speculate whether their median pay is higher, and if so, whether to
seek employment there. Consequently, this type of disclosure would
most likely impair employee morale and productivity, and as a result,
impact the company’s overall performance negatively, which would
arbitrarily harm the company’s investors.
If the goal is to raise the wages of average Americans, publishing
the pay ratio is not going to work.206 At most, it attempts to create
public outrage by disclosing an eye-catching disparity in pay to shame
companies into reducing executive compensation.207 Thus, the pay ra-
tio disclosure is highly likely to be misused for other purposes. As
discussed earlier, a big pay gap is not likely to make a substantial im-
pact on investors’ decision making because investors may not realize
any economic benefits associated with their decision making based on
this type of information.208
Even if the whole plan was to use the pay ratio disclosure as a bully-
ing “name and shame” tactic, it is not going to work to reduce or limit
CEO pay. Unlike current benchmarking disclosures, the pay ratio dis-
closure will not likely provide an incentive to keep executive compen-
sation in check. In fact, it will likely produce the opposite outcome.
The SEC’s last major effort to rein in executive compensation led to
the unintended consequence of increasing company expenses.209
Boards and CEOs may not even feel pressure from the public disclo-
sure. Public disclosures have continually drove up executive compen-
sation as executives became aware of what other executives were
being paid and demanded the company on matching or exceeding
206. See Michele A. Carlin, Yes: The Rule Offers Little Useful Information—to An-
yone, in Should Congress Rescind the Pay-Ratio Rule?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016,
10:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-congress-rescind-the-pay-ratio-rule-
1456715962 [https://perma.cc/9YWY-UCXF].
207. The AFL-CIO, which lobbied for the Rule’s inclusion in the Dodd-Frank Act,
has stated its true purpose: “Disclosing this pay ratio will shame companies into low-
ering C.E.O. pay.” Andrew Ross Sorkin, S.E.C. Has Yet to Set Rule on Tricky Ratio of
C.E.O.’s Pay to Workers’, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:17 PM), https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/tricky-ratio-of-chief-executives-pay-to-workers/
[https://perma.cc/4387-7TU2].
208. See supra Section IV.B.
209. See, e.g., Andrew Thompson, Accounting Professor: Transparency Won’t Nec-
essarily Control CEO Pay, TEMP. U.: TEMP. NOW (Oct. 17, 2007), http://news.temple
.edu/news/accounting-professor-transparency-won%E2%80%99t-necessarily-control-
ceo-pay [https://perma.cc/V239-XELV] (“Despite [the SEC’s disclosure rules], aver-
age CEO compensation climbed from $2.3 million in 1992 to $5.6 million in 2005 —
faster than the pace of inflation.”).
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those amounts when it came to determining their own pay.210 Further-
more, if the goal is to decrease business expenses due to excessive
CEO pay, it will likely result in an increase of expenses as the costs to
comply with the Rule’s requirements are substantial. Therefore, the
pay ratio disclosure is not likely to influence corporate pay practices.
As a result, the Rule also fails to achieve greater equity in
compensation.
Moreover, there are potential consequences beyond investors. The
magnitude of the pay ratio disclosure is likely to exacerbate existing
concerns among the investors, labor groups, and other constituencies
involved in executive compensation practices.211 This type of disclo-
sure has the possible effect of encouraging state legislators to create or
revise state laws based on the now public information, such as impos-
ing taxes on companies with high CEO pay ratios. As a result, this
would ultimately impact consumers, as companies will attempt to pass
on the increases in costs to them. This is not what Congress intended
when it legislated the pay ratio disclosure rule.
Accordingly, the Rule will likely do more harm than good. Without
having any indication of how investors will use the pay ratio, the
SEC’s Rule benefits no one while harming the companies that are
subjected to this overly burdensome requirement and their investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Dodd-Frank Act mandated the pay ratio disclosure, the
statute did not set a time frame for the SEC to act, which raises legiti-
mate questions about the actual usefulness of the proposed disclosure
to investors. Although the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule may be de-
signed to increase transparency, it does not, however, provide inves-
tors more information with which to make informed decisions when
exercising their say-on-pay voting rights. Unfortunately, this disclo-
sure mandate is yet another example of Congress using the SEC to
advance public policy goals not squarely rooted in the SEC’s historic
mission to protect investors.
In light of the controversial and political nature of the Rule, there
are likely to be legal challenges to it.212 Courts have a tendency to
210. Id. See also Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 624 (2013).
211. See, e.g., Steve Seelig, CEO Pay Ratio Opens Fair-Pay Debate to Everyone,
CFO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/ceo-pay-ratio-opens-
fair-pay-debate-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/LWP2-A7FP] (“Local and national politi-
cians will see the numbers, which will predictably lead to more controversy when it
comes to tax laws, government contracting regulations, wage and hour laws, and other
public policies. Unions will use it to promote their case for worker rights and higher
wages.”).
212. On February 3, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive order that
directs federal agencies to conduct a sweeping review of the Dodd-Frank Act rules.
See Gregory Korte & David Jackson, Trump to Dismantle Dodd-Frank Wall Street
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throw out the SEC’s rulemaking because they have failed to conduct
an adequate analysis of the costs and benefits of the rule. As a matter
of fact, the agency has faced a number of challenges in the last few
years.213 The pay ratio disclosure rulemaking here is no better than
mere speculation. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the SEC’s rulemaking
will survive judicial scrutiny as the SEC has failed to investigate
whether or how investors would use the pay ratio in practice.214
The pay ratio disclosure will likely do nothing to further any aspect
of the SEC’s mandate to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. Nor will it do any-
thing further to protect investors as Congress had intended for it to. It
will instead lead to unintended consequences that will negatively af-
fect the overall operations of companies and arbitrarily harm inves-
tors. Even if the true intended goal was to only name and shame
companies into limiting CEO pay, the disclosure of a CEO-to-median-
employee pay ratio also fails to achieve this objective. While the Rule
may be well-intentioned, it is likely to backfire. Unless it can be shown
that the Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule will reap clear benefits for inves-
tors, Congress should promptly move to repeal it.
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